ICPS Newsletter. 199 (September 15)
Could the 1998 economic crisis recur? by -
# 199, 15 September 2003
The Russian financial crisis of 1998 was a
classical time bomb, with systemic
conditions being constantly aggravated by
market factors. When analysing the reasons
behind those developments, it is important
to isolate the systemic causes for the
August default; they include the following: 
• structural problems of the Russian
economy, which are typical for the former
USSR republics (excessive government
interference in the economy,
underdeveloped market institutions, a weak
stock market, etc.); 
• imbalanced budget policy pursued by the
government; 
• risky policy of public borrowing; 
• policy of artificially propping up the
national currency. 
The effect of these internal systemic factors
was aided by external factors such as
volatility (poor predictability) of global
financial markets as a result of the Asian
financial crisis that had erupted in 1997 in
Southeast Asia and hurt the global economy,
combined with overly low prices on Russia’s
staple export item—oil. Political instability
also contributed—namely, the threat of
dissolving the State Duma and the miners’
strikes. The decisions of the Russian
government dated 17 August 1998 were the
bomb’s indicator rather than its detonator,
warning the public about the imminent
explosion. 
Recall also that the currency corridor
parameters were drastically revised then; this
decision, immediately following the
statements of President Boris Yeltsin that the
rouble would not be devaluated completely
undermined the trust of market agents. In
addition, a number of restricting measures
were implemented with regard to currency
operations (in particular, a 901day moratorium
on banks’ payments on loans from non1
residents); and future unilateral debt
restructuring was announced for State
Treasury obligations—federal loan bonds 
(T1bonds). In fact, this amounted to an
announcement that the state was unable to
pay its debts, and the word default, little
known in this part of the world, came into use. 
The reaction of individuals and businesses
was predictable—Russians were stricken
with panic buying of American dollars and
withdrew their bank deposits, the shares of
Russian companies depreciated, and many
sales outlets closed for inventory. The
Central Bank had to cancel dollar trading at
the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange
(MICEX), stating that currency reserves
could not be spent to buoy the rouble. 
Financial conflagration 
in Ukraine 
It is utterly incorrect to maintain that a
large trade turnover and the traditional
economic connections between the two
republics of the former USSR were behind
the 1998 crisis in Ukraine. 
In fact, in reforming its economy during the
1990s, Ukraine had simply followed Russia’s
pattern, with a one1 or two1year delay. As a
results, all the remarks about the systemic
reasons, typical for the Russian Federation
at that time, are applicable to Ukraine as
well. 
The exacerbated global crisis, which in 1998
spilled over from Asia to Eastern Europe and
Latin America, triggered the flight of capital
from Ukraine. 
While in H1’98 the balance of payments
could somehow or other be bolstered by
placing domestic and foreign government
bonds, in H2’98 these sources of financing
were no longer possible. 
Ukraine was then saved from bankruptcy by
loans from international organisations,
precise actions of the National Bank of
Ukraine in the money market, and a
relatively successful conversion of state
securities. 
As Russia did, Ukraine was forced to
renounce its currency corridor. A new range
of hryvnia1to1dollar fluctuations was
announced—2.5–3.5 UAH/USD. This led to
a final loss of investors’ trust, since they
had come to the Ukrainian market
expecting that by year1end 1998 the
hryvnia rate would not sink below the 2.25
UAH/USD declared by the government. On
the other hand, if the NBU had not
abandoned its former parameters of the
currency corridor and resorted to a drastic
hryvnia depreciation, it would have lost all
its currency reserves, which anyway had
shrunk to 700 million USD by the end of
September. 
The fundamental reasons for Ukraine’s
1998 economic crisis were the lack of vital
reforms at the enterprise level, as well
continuing unnecessary and ineffective
state expenditures, which unbalanced the
budget. Direct budget financing and, later,
hidden subsidies in the form of tax
benefits and special loans, as well as the
silent consent of the government to
budget non1payments and payment of
taxes by way of mutual debt write1officials,
perceptibly undermined the performance
of former Soviet enterprises. A low
privatisation rate, along with poorly
motivated lax private business activity at
the state level, failed to overcome the
ruinous economic policy pursued by the
government. 
The unreformed economy continued to
unbalance the budget. Having refused the
National Bank’s direct loans, which
produced only a short1lived inflationary
effect, in 1996 the government first
entered the market of domestic public
borrowing, then in 1997 went to foreign
capital markets. At that time, it seemed a
cure1all; the 1997 budget deficit surged to
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6.7% of GDP, while the redistribution of the
gross national product via budget
approached the value of the early 1990s—
33%. The sequestration of the budget
declared in summer could not save the day. 
A small victory for the Finance Ministry—
Ukraine’s first entry to international loan
markets, which allowed to attract about 
1 billion USD and replenish currency
reserves—nearly turned into a Pyrrhic one.
It was only thanks to tremendous effort
that Ukraine in 2000 was able to
restructure its euro1obligations and avoid
declaring a default, which would cut off
access to external financing for a long
time. 
Thus, in 1998 the Ukrainian government
ended up paying for its irresponsible
economic policy in the mid11990s. Instead
of anticipated economic growth and
strengthened financial stability, the
country again witnessed a drop in GDP, an
abruptly depreciated national currency by
80% per annum, a 20% growth of the
annual inflation indicator, and a
considerable decline in real personal
incomes. 
Lessons from the crisis 
The 1998 financial crisis taught Ukraine
the two probably most vital lessons of its
new history. Firstly, the budget gap should
not be big for a long time under a negative
balance of payments; sooner or later, the
explicit or implicit deficit will trigger a
macroeconomic imbalance. The real
positive result of 1998 was the arrested
growth of the debt pyramid, which sooner
or later would have crumbled because of
irrational use of funds by the government;
also, secondly, it ultimately became
obvious that the government was not to be
trusted. 
Those who failed to understand this idea in
1991–1992 came to grips with it in 1998.
Probably, that shock became the most
powerful impetus to unleash the economic
activity of the population than all reforms
undertaken before that, and heralded a
high rate of economic growth in
2000–2003. 
The currency depreciation, however late,
bolstered the economy immensely. In many
sectors, enterprises that were on the verge
of capitulating before foreign rivals were
bestowed with the “gift” of a sudden surge
in prices for foreign products. Many
enterprises took advantage of the time
gained to re1charge their batteries and
strengthen their standing in the domestic
market. 
In many ways, the August crisis of 1998
acted as a “shock therapy” for Ukraine, the
idea of which had been suggested in the
early 1990s by Western advisors, while
Russian liberal reformists followed by their
Ukrainian counterparts adopted it as half
measures. The therapy of 1998 helped
tremendously in eradicating the domination
of the “virtual economy” in Russia (this
term was introduced by the prominent
American economists Geddy and Ickes). One
of the consequences of the crisis was the
sudden tightening of budget policy. Since
then, the government’s “norm of decorum”
became the adoption of a deficit1free or
small1deficit budget. 
The crisis also taught the IMF a great
lesson, whose policy was heavily castigated
for its ineffectiveness in transition
economies. Consequently, in the late 1990s
international financial organisations
revised their working principles. It was
officially acknowledged that their financial
assistance could not be regarded as a cure1
all—it only allows to cover up financial
problems in an ailing national economy
and refrain from undertaking crucial
reforms. 
Default II—is it possible? 
Over the past five years, Ukraine has
encountered crisis situations more than
once; it is sufficient to recall the gasoline
crisis in the summer 1999 and, again, this
year’s food crisis. 
The developments of summer 2003 vividly
signalled about the lack of an effective
government policy in the grain market. On
the one hand, market mechanisms have not
been formed so far, the market remains
non1transparent, and therefore cannot react
adequately to demand/supply changes. On
the other hand, the state renounced its
stabilising role and started to pay less
attention to the formation of national
reserves of strategic goods (foodstuffs, oil,
gasoline). This may trigger sharp price
fluctuations in the market, and hence,
cause a systemic crisis. Having on hand
only its levers of administrative pressure
upon enterprises, without trustworthy
information about the grain (oil, etc.)
balance, the state has turned out to be
unprepared for the crisis in the market for
bare necessities. 
There is still a risk of distortions in tax and
pension reform. The forecast for an increase
in the tax base as a result of decreased tax
rates is grounded upon expectations of a
considerable “de1shadowing” of
entrepreneurs and profit legalisation.
However, the reform also envisages to
abruptly slash tax benefits. There is a high
risk of many of the entrepreneurs who had
enjoyed the benefits going into the shadow.
Consequently, a mitigated tax pressure and
reduced benefits may trigger not only a drop
in budget revenues, but also “unexpected”
narrowing of the tax base. 
The next risk factor to be admitted is a high
dependence on the external market
situation. Recently, Ukrainian producers
have managed to expand external markets.
Conditions beneficial for export growth
include price increases for Ukraine’s staple
exports and real depreciation of the
Ukrainian currency (according ICPS
calculations, the Ukrainian currency under
the real effective exchange rate is worth
half of its cost today compared to the early
1998). Regardless their non1participation in
the WTO, Ukrainian goods are in steady
demand abroad. 
Nevertheless, the economy’s dependence
upon external demand is looming large.
Exports have already gone above 60% of
GDP. Along with that, ferrous metals account
for almost one1third of exports. In the
meantime, metallurgical producers
announce a decline in profitability. This
means that dramatic fluctuations in the
market for ferrous metals, for example, an
intensified competition from Asian
producers, in the first place, or a
deteriorated economic situation of major
trading partners of Ukraine are able to
seriously sap the profits of exporters. In this
situation, it is crucial to focus on domestic
market development, and to foster domestic
consumption. It is essential to strengthen
Ukraine’s standing as a principal transit
state in the region. 
One of the paramount implications of the
crisis was the loss of investors’ trust, which
is far more difficult to win back than to
restore a favourable market situation.
Judging from recent developments in both
the Russian Federation and Ukraine having
to do with pursuing “political and economic
ends”, August of 1998 never taught the
government to treasure this trust. 
In the meantime, the banking system has
got into habit of replenishing their
resources from a rapid growth in deposits.
At the same time, a high risk of escalating
inflation may entail a faster growth of prices
than of deposit rates. The risk of disrupted
inflow of deposit money to banks will alter
today’s way of banking business, which may
drive up the number of loss1making banks. 
Thus, the above1mentioned “weaknesses” of
the Ukrainian economy are unlikely, as they
are, to set off the crisis, which, by its scale,
may be compared to that of 1998. But solely
successful government actions of preventing
any possible distortions in specific
segments of the economy, proceeding with
comprehensive market reforms, setting well1
defined economic goals can diminish
chances of crunch situations.
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